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Pangloss Responds
Daniel A. Crane*
I am afraid that William Shieber and I are speaking past each other. I
agree wholeheartedly with his assertion that anyone who believes that
political appointees do not exert a considerable influence over the antitrust
agencies is naïve. However, Technocracy and Antitrust1 does not advance
the Panglossian view that the antitrust agencies are apolitical, if by that we
mean that robotic machines devoid of human perspective or ideological
commitment churn out scientifically predetermined antitrust results. Instead,
my article extends and updates Richard Hofstadter’s claim2 that antitrust has
ceased to be a popular political movement, that it has virtually disappeared
from national political debate, that it is beyond the view or concern of the
average voter, that Presidents and elected officials no longer pay much
attention to it, and that the enterprise is largely run by specialized experts. It
is in that sense that antitrust has become “technocratic.”
To say that antitrust is largely technocratic (although my article also
discusses a number of ways in which it is not), is not to say that antitrust
cases are devoid of political maneuvering. Indeed, contrary to the impression
left by Mr. Shieber, in the article I explicitly acknowledge that there was
much political maneuvering in the Microsoft case.3 I note that “[p]oliticians
from the State of Washington (where Microsoft is headquartered) lobbied
behind the scenes for Microsoft while politicians from Utah (where
Microsoft’s rival Novell is located) lobbied against Microsoft” and that
“Microsoft lavished its ample resources to make friends and influence
people.”4 The important point, however, is that neither political party
elevated the Microsoft case to a campaign issue and the skirmishing did not
track ideological fault lines. Indeed, it is worth noting that Robert Bork, the
very portrait of Chicago School conservatism,5 became a high-profile
advocate for Netscape against Microsoft6 while Democratic politicians from
Washington were standing up for their hometown favorite.
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Mr. Shieber thinks that the best evidence of ideological influences in
Microsoft is that the Bush Justice Department ended up settling the litigation
on terms explicitly rejected two years earlier by the Clinton Administration.
However, Mr. Shieber omits to mention a game-changing event that occurred
in the intervening years. The D.C. Circuit vacated large portions of the
District Court opinion, upheld a number of Microsoft’s practices as legal,
entirely vacated Judge Jackson’s remedy decision, and remanded the case to
a new district judge after finding impropriety on Judge Jackson’s part.7
Although the Circuit Court affirmed some important findings of liability
against Microsoft, the decision altered the dynamics of the case in
Microsoft’s favor. In particular, it took away the government’s whip
hands—a break-up remedy and Judge Jackson.
I do not doubt that the Bush Administration’s greater friendliness to big
business played a role in the Microsoft settlement and its merger policy. I do
not doubt that ideology continues to play a role in antitrust enforcement, that
the choice of political appointees matters, and that “conservative”
administrations will generally pursue less enforcement than “liberal”
administrations. My article did not claim that ideology and politics have no
more purchase in antitrust. On the other hand, I think it is also beyond
dispute that the ideological chasm in antitrust has narrowed considerably,
that antitrust has lost its popular political salience, that inter-administration
shifts in enforcement are far less pronounced today than they were during the
first half of the twentieth century, and that antitrust today is largely the
province of experts.
Whether this is all to the good is another question. I believe it is, but
since Mr. Shieber does not raise that question, I will let it rest as well.

7. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

